Azerbaijan’s Aliyev Is Digging His Own Political Grave
Azerbaijan’s Aliyev Is Digging His Own Political Grave
By: M. Burhanuddin Qasmi
Editor: Eastern Crescent, Mumbai
Azerbaijan appears to be heading towards a situation reminiscent of Tunisia under Zine El Abidine Ben Ali or Syria under Bashar al-Assad. Every rise has a fall, and every dictator has an end too.
The recent protests in Azerbaijan have been fueled by the actions of Ilham Aliyev and his ruling clan, particularly reports of female students and teachers being forced to remove their headscarves in a country that is Muslim-majority in population, if not in the conduct of its state. The communist era of the Soviet Union is long gone, yet leaders shaped by its legacy continue to hold power in several former Soviet republics, including Azerbaijan.
The protests against the hijab restrictions have the potential to grow into a wider crisis. Aliyev may find it increasingly difficult to protect his position at a time when Russia is no longer an entirely dependable partner and neighbouring Iran and Armenia are hardly allies. More significantly, Turkey and Pakistan—Azerbaijan’s longstanding and closest friends—cannot be expected to remain comfortable with a policy that all practicing Muslims regard as un-Islamic, undemocratic and oppressive. Even if their governments wished to assist Aliyev politically, public anger over the restrictions could make doing so difficult.
Turkey is no longer the country of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whose government imposed restrictions on headscarves in public life. Pakistani public opinion, meanwhile, is often vocal on issues seen as Islamic, even if the country’s political and military leadership does not always practise what it professes. In both countries, a policy perceived as an attack on Muslim religious expression could provoke strong public criticism of Azerbaijan’s leadership.
Europe and the United States, meanwhile, are unlikely to rush to Aliyev’s defence. Azerbaijan’s wars over Karabakh and its conflict with Armenia have shaped its international relationships, while Turkey played a decisive role in helping Baku secure its military victory. Western governments have their own strategic calculations, particularly amid the continuing Russia–Ukraine war, and may offer little more than statements or media commentary. Some voices may defend Azerbaijan in the name of secularism, but such arguments can appear selective when democratic principles are invoked inconsistently in Muslim-majority countries.
Israel, perhaps Azerbaijan’s most conspicuous partner on this issue, is geographically separated from the country and is in no position to guarantee the survival of Aliyev’s government. Its own confrontation with Iran and the wider US–Israel regional conflict further limits its ability to provide any substantial support. Moreover, the more openly Israel backs Azerbaijan over a matter involving Muslim religious expression, the more politically isolated Baku risks becoming among Muslims worldwide.
At present, Azerbaijan appears to have few dependable friends on this issue among its neighbours or across the wider Muslim world, including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the Gulf Arab states. Many Muslims who sympathised with Azerbaijan during the Karabakh war are now angered by what they regard as an anti-Islamic and Islamophobic policy being pursued under the guise of secularism.
The wider regional context also matters. Most Azerbaijanis are Shia Muslims and share religious ties with Iran, while language and cultural connections bind many of them closely to Sunni-majority Turkey. Even if the governments in Tehran and Ankara refrain from openly challenging Baku because of current geopolitical calculations, public opinion across the borders may still influence Azerbaijanis through family connections, religious affinity and cultural exchange.
So far, the protests appear limited and largely school-based, with no evidence of outside direction. That can change gradually. If the restrictions persist, the demonstrations may spread, and other actors may eventually try to exploit the unrest. Aliyev would be unwise to dismiss the protests or assume that coercion alone can contain them.
His safest course is to withdraw the restrictions and respect the religious freedoms and dignity of his own citizens. A government that turns a personal matter of faith into a confrontation with its people risks creating a crisis it may not be able to control. No ruler can suppress the aspirations of an entire population indefinitely. If Aliyev continues down this path, he may indeed be digging his own political grave.
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